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THE MASSACHUSETTS BURMA LAW-THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S
DECISION TO STEM THE TIDE OF INCREASING SUB-NATIONAL
ACTOR PARTICIPATION IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
IN NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE
COUNCIL v. NATSIOS
"A house divided against itself cannot stand. ",
I. INTRODUCTION: A STATE OF FLUX
In recent decades, few have challenged the notion that states have
little business meddling in the arena of international affairs. 2 Neverthe-
less, with the end of the Cold War and the move toward democracy in all
major quadrants of the world, recent cases and commentators have pulled
back from this position and increasingly have supported sub-national actor
participation in the field of foreign relations. 3 Despite this movement, the
Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted the Constitution as
1. Abraham Lincoln, Acceptance Speech for Republican Nomination for U.S.
Senate (June 1858), available in CREATED EQUAL? THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DoUc-
tAS DEBATES OF 1858 2 (Paul M. Angle ed., Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press 1958).
2. See Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1223,
1224 (1999) (noting that foreign affairs power is intimately related with federalism
issues). Indeed, the Cold War years represented an era where federal exclusivity in
foreign affairs matters ruled the day. See id. at 1228. Moreover, as some commen-
tators acknowledge, at the end of the twentieth century, much like the end of the
eighteenth century, states do not appear to exist. See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman,
Nonactor States In U.S. Foreign Relations?: The Massachusetts Burma Law, 92 Am. Soc'v
INr'L L. PROC. 350, 350 (1998) (discussing lack of state involvement in U.S. foreign
relations).
3. See Spiro, supra note 2, at 1223-24 (noting that end of Cold War has consid-
erably diminished probable magnitude of retaliation and national security con-
cerns). Some commentators argue that the "chang[ing] global dynamic" should
support the abandonment of federal exclusivity over foreign affairs, and allow for
greater state and local participation. Id. at 1226; see Trachtman, supra note 2, at
350 (noting that present state of foreign relations includes more topics keenly rele-
vant to state and local governments).
Likewise, some commentators urge that states have not been adequately rep-
resented in the negotiation of international instruments that are extremely impor-
tant to state governance. See generally Robert Stumberg, Sovereignty By Subtraction:
The Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 491 (1998) (noting
that proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment ("MAI") will limit states' gov-
erning power in area of international trade). For example, Professor Stumberg
argues that the proposed MAI, would take away crucial lawmaking authority from
the states. See id. at 585 (noting that MAI would alter delicate balance of power
between state and federal governments). In addition, Professor Stumberg argues
that proposed international agreements, such as the MAI, do not adequately rec-
ognize state interests at a time of increased globalization. See id.
(137)
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vesting exclusive control over foreign relations in the federal
government.
4
With the threat to national security at a minimum, relative to the Cold
War era, and the diminished risk of international retaliation flowing there-
from, it is time for a definitive answer to the question of permissible state
involvement in foreign affairs.5 The oft-criticized standard, enunciated by
the Supreme Court in Zschernig v. Miller,6 coupled with its dilution in re-
cent years, illustrates the need for resolution in these areas of constitu-
tional and international law.
7
In 1996, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts injected itself into the
ongoing debate over the proper level of state and local involvement in
foreign affairs by enacting a law that effectively prohibited the Common-
wealth from doing business with companies engaged in business relations
with Burma (Myanmar).8 In challenging this law, the National Foreign
Trade Council ("NFTC") used the opportunity to urge the judiciary to
settle definitively the issue of the permissible level of sub-national actor
participation in foreign affairs. 9 Accordingly, National Foreign Trade Coun-
cil v. Natsios10 presented itself to the Supreme Court as the first opportu-
nity since its decision in Zschernig to address the issue in light of the
increasingly expanding global stage."
4. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (holding that Oregon stat-
ute was "an intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Consti-
tution entrusts to the President and the Congress"); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 63 (1941) (noting that federal power in foreign relations should be left free
from local interference).
5. See Thomas E. L. Dewey, Can U.S. Have 50 Foreign Policies?, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
16, 1999, at A19 (recognizing need for definitive answer to permissible level of
state involvement in foreign affairs). For a further discussion of factors influenc-
ing support for increased state participation in foreign affairs, see supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
6. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
7. See Spiro, supra note 2, at 1225 (noting that subsequent Supreme Court
decisions have diluted effect of Zschernig); see also Dewey, supra note 5, at A19 (call-
ing upon Supreme Court for definitive resolution of threshold level of permissible
state involvement in foreign relations).
8. See Ch. 130, 1996 Mass. Acts 239 (codified at MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 7,
§§ 22G-22M (West Supp. 1998)) [hereinafter "Massachusetts Burma Law" or "Mas-
sachusetts law"]. In 1989 Burma changed its name to Myanmar. Nonetheless, be-
cause the name "Burma" is referred to in the legislation at issue and all the
relevant commentary, Burma will be used throughout this Note.
9. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 65, National Foreign Trade Council v. Nat-
sios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 1220 S. Ct. 525 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1999)
(No. 98-2304) (asking First Circuit to affirm judgment of district court that Massa-
chusetts Burma Law unconstitutionally infringes upon federal government's exclu-
sive foreign affairs power).
10. 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (U.S. Nov. 29,
1999).
11. See id. at 56-57 (noting that "Zschernig remains '[t] he only case in which the
Supreme Court has struck down a state statute as violative of the foreign affairs
power' of the federal government") (quoting International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker
Owners v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998)) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 45: p. 137
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This Note discusses the development of the law regarding the permis-
sible level of state involvement in foreign affairs. 12 Part II summarizes the
constitutional and policy-related issues associated with sub-national actor
participation in international affairs.1 3 Part III outlines the facts and
events giving rise to Natsios, in which the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit struck down the Massachusetts Burma Law as unconsti-
tutional.1 4 Part IV addresses the reasoning of the First Circuit and the
propriety of its decision. 15 Part IV also discusses how the First Circuit,
mindful of the international ramifications of its decision, championed the
causes of federalism and federal exclusivity in the arena of foreign affairs,
when state involvement places the United States in the uncomfortable po-
sition of breaching its international obligations. 16 Part V of this Casenote
focuses on the practical effects of the First Circuit's decision, as it pertains
to both domestic and international affairs. 17
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Zschernig Pronouncement
The Supreme Court's decision in Zschernig followed a long line of de-
cisions upholding the primacy of the federal government's power in the
foreign affairs arena.' 8 In Zschernig, the appellants, residents of East Ger-
12. For a discussion of the development and current status of the law regard-
ing the permissible level of sub-national actor participation in foreign affairs, see
infra notes 17-174 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the constitutional and policy-related issues flowing
from the increasing incidence with which state and local actors are venturing into
the field of foreign affairs, see infra notes 18-64 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the facts of Natsios, see infra notes 65-78 and accompa-
nying text.
15. For a discussion and critique of the court's rationale in Natsios, see infra
notes 79-152 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the impact that state and local selective purchasing
laws could have on the federal government's ability to conduct foreign affairs, see
infra notes 153-74 and accompanying text. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 51 (recognizing
that requiring state court inquiries into types of governments of foreign nations
"affect [ I international relations in a persistent and subtle way," and thus "may
well adversely affect the power of the central government to deal with" problems of
international affairs) (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968));
Paven Malhotra, Cities and States: Local Actors in US Foreign Policy, HARV. INT'L REV.
Spring 1999, at 39, 41 (noting probability of state action inviting international in-
dignation and subjecting U.S. to actions for breach of international obligations).
17. For a discussion of the possible impact of the Natsios decision, see infra
notes 153-74 and accompanying text.
18. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441 (recognizing that Oregon statute intrudes on
federal government's power over foreign relations). In 1937, the Supreme Court
authoritatively stated that the federal government exercised complete and exclu-
sive control over the foreign affairs of the United States. See United States v. Bel-
mont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937). Five years later, the Court again recognized that
the broad authority of the federal government over foreign affairs was exclusive.
See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) (citing Belmont as controlling
precedent); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (same).
3
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many and the sole heirs of an American citizen who died intestate in Ore-
gon, challenged the constitutionality of an Oregon law that denied
inheritance rights to nonresident aliens if they lived in countries that did
not provide reciprocal rights to citizens of the United States.' 9 Specifi-
cally, the statute barred a nonresident alien from taking property by testa-
mentary disposition or succession unless he or she showed the existence of
three conditions, all of which required some degree of reciprocity be-
tween the rights guaranteed by the United States and those recognized by
the foreign country.20 The Supreme Court held that as applied by Ore-
gon, the three provisions in question involved the state in foreign affairs
and international relations, matters that the Constitution entrusts solely to
the federal government. 21 The statute provided that if these conditions
were not met, and there were no other heirs, devisees or those eligible to
take the property, the estate would escheat to the state.
22
Accordingly, the Court held that the Oregon law was unconstitutional
because it required Oregon probate courts to launch delicate inquiries
into the types of governments of foreign nations.23 Such evaluations, the
Court said, "inescapab[ly] . . .affect[ ] international relations in a persis-
tent and subtle way," and thus, "may well adversely affect the power of the
central government to deal with those problems." 24 Although Zschernig
presented the first opportunity for the Court to confront the question of
19. See Daniel M. Price &John P. Hannah, The Constitutionality of United States
State and Local Sanctions, 39 HARv. INT'L LJ. 443, 457 (1998) (noting reciprocity
requirement of section 111.070 of the Oregon Revised Statutes).
20. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430-31 (discussing Oregon statute). Section
111.070 of the Oregon Revised Statutes provided for escheat to the state in cases
where a nonresident alien claimed property unless the following three conditions
were met:
(1) [T] he existence of a reciprocal right of a United States citizen to take
property on the same terms as a citizen or inhabitant of the foreign
country;
(2) the right of United States citizens to receive payment here of funds
from estates in the foreign country; and
(3) the right of the foreign heirs to receive the proceeds of Oregon es-
tates "without confiscation."
OR. REV. STAT. § 111.070 (1957).
The Zschernig Court noted that the Oregon decisions interpreting these sections
made clear that courts were inquiring into the types of governments of foreign
nations and were being driven by foreign policy attitudes regarding the continu-
ance of the "Cold War." See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 437-38. The Court continued by
explaining that such matters are for the federal government, not local probate
courts. See id.
21. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 429 (distinguishing Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503
(1947), and striking down Oregon law as unconstitutional infringement on foreign
affairs power of federal government).
22. See id. at 430 (noting that Oregon statute provided for escheat to state of
property unless reciprocity requirements were met).
23. See id. at 434 (noting that inheritance statutes required probate courts to
launch delicate inquiries into types of governments that obtain in foreign nations).
24. Id. at 440-41.
[Vol. 45: p. 137
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whether a state or local law could be violative of the Constitution's foreign
affairs provisions in the absence of federal preemption, the Court none-
theless based its reasoning on the logic of its earlier foreign affairs
jurisprudence. 25
As the seminal case on this issue, Zschernig provided guidelines to aid
in determining whether a local law unlawfully infringes on the foreign
affairs power of the federal government. 26 Unfortunately, a number of
commentators have questioned the utility of Zschernig, referring to it as
25. See id. at 441 (recognizing that Oregon statute intrudes on federal govern-
ment's power over foreign relations); see also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,
233 (1942) (stating that "[p]ower over external affairs is not shared by the States; it
is vested in the national government exclusively"); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 63 (1941) (stating that field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from
local interference); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (noting
federal government's dominion over foreign affairs).
26. See Price & Hanna, supra note 19, at 457-59 (discussing guidelines enunci-
ated by Court in Zschernig). Several aspects of Zschernig bear heavily on subsequent
interpretations of its holding. First, the Court struck down the Oregon law despite
the fact that the Executive Branch, on brief for amicus curiae, argued that the law
did not interfere with the federal government's power over foreign affairs. See id.
at 457 (citing Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434). For a discussion of congressional acquies-
cence in Natsios, see infra note 81 and accompanying text. Thus, it appears from
the Court's response that the Executive Branch's view on the matter is not disposi-
tive. See Price & Hannah, supra note 19, at 457 (noting that executive branch view
is not dispositive). Indeed, in his concurrence in Zschernig, Justice Stewart treated
the issue in the following manner:
We deal here with the basic allocation of power between the States and
the Nation. Resolution of so fundamental a constitutional issue cannot
vary from day to day with the shifting winds at the State Department.
Today, we are told, Oregon's statute does not conflict With the national
interest. Tomorrow it may.
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 438 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Second, the Court also noted that, in at least one instance, the law prompted a
foreign government to lodge a complaint with the State Department. See Price &
Hanna, supra note 19, at 457-58 (citing Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 437 n.7). Again,
although not dispositive, the Court's treatment of this issue leaves open the oppor-
tunity for courts to consider the concerns of foreign governments when determin-
ing the extent to which a state law encroaches on the powers of the federal
government. See id. For a further discussion of how the opinion of foreign govern-
ments weighed on the minds of the First Circuit in Natsios, see infra notes 113-15
and accompanying text.
Third, in assessing the possible implications of the Oregon law-should it be
allowed to stand-the Court looked to the prevalence of similar laws in New York,
Pennsylvania and Montana to determine the cumulative effect that a legion of sim-
ilar laws would have on the federal government's ability to maintain a consistent
foreign policy. See Price & Hannah, supra note 19, at 458 (discussing Court's analy-
sis of cumulative effect of similar laws in other jurisdictions). For a discussion of
the existence of state and local laws akin to the Massachusetts Burma Law, see infra
notes 67, 69-70 and accompanying text.
Fourth, the Court struck down the Oregon statute, despite the fact that pro-
bate law was traditionally an area of state concern. See Price & Hannah, supra note
19, at 458 (noting Court's decision to strike down statute despite fact that probate
law was traditional area of state concern). Nonetheless, the Court made clear that
such concerns "must give way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation's
foreign policy." Id. (quoting Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440).
2000] NOTE
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both an ambiguous pronouncement on foreign affairs jurisprudence and
an inapplicable relic of the Cold War era.27 As an off-shoot of this reason-
ing, many contend that Zschernig's effect has been diluted in recent years
by a number of subsequent Supreme Court proclamations.
28
B. SUBSEQUENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND
THEIR EFFECT ON Zschernig
1. The Barclays Decision
In Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board,29 the Supreme Court up-
held a California corporate tax system against challenges claiming that the
system's worldwide combined reporting requirement was violative of the
Commerce and Due Process Clauses. 30 The Petitioner, Barclays, argued
that the law burdened foreign-based multinational corporations and im-
peded the ability of the federal government to "speak with one voice when
regulating commercial relations with foreign governments. "31 The Bar-
clays Court noted that, besides the ordinary domestic Commerce Clause
Lastly, Zschernig does not stand for the proposition that any statute that has
some effect on foreign affairs is unconstitutional. See id. (discussing limitations on
Zschernig's holding). Nonetheless, when a law has more than an "indirect or inci-
dental effect in foreign countries," and when it creates "great potential for disrup-
tion or embarrassment" to United States foreign policy, it must be struck down. Id.
(citing Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434-35).
27. See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 165 n.2 (2d
ed. 1996) (noting that Zschernig may merely become relic of Cold War, with no
future value); Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law, 70 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1089, 1105 (1999) (noting that Zschernig "clearly seem[s] to be a product of
the Cold War era"); Alejandra Carvajal, Note, State and Local "Free Burma" Laws:
The Case For Sub-National Trade Sanctions, 29 LAw & POL'V INT'L Bus. 257, 267
(1998) (noting that Zschernig was decided at height of Cold War).
In addition to those who argue that Zschernig is limited by the era in which it
was decided, many commentators also note that the precise holding of Zschernig is
unclear. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 51-52 (1st Cir.
1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1999) (stating that precise bound-
aries of holding in Zschernig are unclear); see also Geraldo Pascual, Note, State Buy
American Laws In a World of Liberal Trade, 7 CONN.J. INT'L L. 311, 323 (1992) (not-
ing that "exact holding of Zschernig is ambiguous").
28. See Lynn Loschin &Jennifer Anderson, Massachusetts Challenges the Burmese
Dictators: The Constitutionality of Selective Purchasing Laws, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
373, 404 (1999) (noting that Supreme Court's decision not to strike down any
other state laws on Zschernig grounds suggests that Zschernigis limited); Trachtman,
supra note 2, at 356 (noting that Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. 512 U.S. 298
(1994), "illustrates a shift toward greater deference to state law"); see alsoJack L.
Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1700-
01 (1997) (contending that Barclays undercuts Zschernig). But see Harold Hongju
Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1824, 1848 (1998)
(arguing that it would be wrong to overstate influence of Barclays).
29. 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
30. See id. at 298-99 (upholding California corporate tax system against Com-
merce and Due Process Clause challenges).
31. Id. at 302-03 (quotingJapan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434,
449 (1979)).
[Vol. 45: p. 137
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analysis announced in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,32 state regulation
of foreign commerce gives rise to two ancillary issues: first, an "enhanced
risk of multiple taxation," 33 and second, the risk of impinging on the
"Ifflederal [g]overnment's ability to 'speak with one voice when regulating
commercial relations with foreign governments.' '3 4 Nonetheless, in the
absence of action taken by Congress or the Executive challenging the Cali-
fornia law as a violation of federal policy, the Court could not "conclude
that 'the foreign policy of the United States . . . [was] so seriously
threatened' by California's practice as to warrant [its] intervention."35
2. Other Decisions Under Zschernig
In a line of cases following Zschernig, courts split as to its interpreta-
tion when faced with challenges to state and local laws brought under its
mandate.36 These cases fall into two categories: "challenges to the applica-
tion of laws targeting specific foreign states, and challenges to state 'buy-
American' laws." 3 7 Of those, cases appear on both ends of the judicial
spectrum.3 8 Some courts find the challenged state and local laws to be
impermissible encroachments on the foreign affairs power of the central
government.3 9 Conversely, some courts permit a greater degree of state
and local involvement in similar ventures. 40
32. 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1979).
33. Barclays, 512 U.S. at 311 (quoting Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 185 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Id. (quoting Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 449) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
35. Id. at 327 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Container
Corp., 463 U.S. at 196).
36. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 55-56 (1st Cir.
1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1999) (noting split between courts
on interpretation of Zschernig).
37. Id.
38. See id. (discussing cases that appear on both ends of judicial spectrum).
39. See Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300, 307
(Ill. 1986) (holding tax exemption to be impermissible encroachment on foreign
affairs power of federal government); New York Times Co. v. City of New York
Comm'n on Human Rights, 361 N.E.2d 963, 969 (N.Y. 1977) (holding New York
law impermissible under Zschernig).
40. See Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 913 (3d Cir. 1990)
(upholding state "buy-American" statute); Board of Trustees of the Employees Re-
tirement Sys. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 746 (Md. 1989)
(upholding local divestment ordinances as permissible involvement in foreign af-
fairs). See generally K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply
Comm'n, 381 A.2d 774 (N.J. 1977) (holding that state "buy-American" statute is
permissible under Zschernig).
2000] NOTE
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a. Cases Striking Down State and Local Laws as Impermissible
Encroachments on the Nation's Foreign Policy
In New York Times Co. v. City of New York Commission on Human Rights,4'
the Court of Appeals of New York held that New York could not enforce
local antidiscrimination laws that prohibited the New York Times from run-
ning an advertisement for employment opportunities in South Africa.
42
Under Zschernig, the court said that even longstanding state regulation
must give way if its enforcement would "impair the effective exercise of the
nation's foreign policy."4
3
Likewise, in Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson,44 the Illinois
Supreme Court struck down a law excluding only South African coins
from state tax exemptions.45 The Illinois court held that the law was en-
acted for the sole purpose of boycotting the South African Krugerrand
because of the state's displeasure with South Africa's apartheid policies.
46
Such measures, the court held, were "outside the [scope] of permissible
state activity."47
b. Cases Permitting Greater State and Local Involvement in Foreign
Affairs
At the other end of the spectrum are cases that support the view of
increased sub-national actor participation in arenas that touch upon the
sensitive nature of foreign relations. 48 For example, in Board of Trustees of
the Employees' Retirement System v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,49 the
Maryland Court of Appeals found that local divestment ordinances did not
interfere with the Nation's ability to achieve its foreign policy directives,
41. 361 N.E.2d 963 (N.Y. 1977).
42. See id. at 969 (finding that New York could not apply local antidiscrimina-
tion laws to prohibit New York Times newspaper from advertising employment op-
portunities in South Africa).
43. Id. at 968 (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968)).
44. 503 N.E.2d 300 (Il1. 1986).
45. See id. at 307 (holding that disapproval of political or social policies of
foreign nation does not provide valid basis for tax classification). In this instance,
the tax exemption applied equally to coins and currency issued by all other coun-
tries. See id. at 302 (noting South African coins' exclusion from tax exempt status
and inclusion of all other countries' currencies).
46. See id. (noting discriminatory purpose of Illinois statute). The Krugerrand
is a gold coin issued by the Republic of South Africa. See id. at 302.
47. Id. The federal courts have similarly held that where laws go too far in
addressing sensitive issues that could adversely affect international relations, they
must be held unconstitutional. See, e.g., Tayyari v. New Mexico State Univ., 495 F.
Supp. 1365, 1376-80 (D.N.M. 1980) (holding that state university's policy of bar-
ring admission or readmission of Iranian students could adversely affect interna-
tional relations, and as such, was impermissible).
48. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 55-57 (1st Cir.
1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1999) (noting loose interpreta-
tions of Zschernig).
49. 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989).
[Vol. 45: p. 137
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and thus, were not unconstitutional under Zschernig.50 The Maryland
court reasoned that even though Zschernig circumscribes a state's ability to
take actions involving substantive judgments about foreign nations, it does
not per se prohibit such forays.
51
In two cases involving "buy-American" statutes, the court in each in-
stance upheld the law, at least in part because the statutes did not require
state governments to inquire into the policies of foreign nations, and be-
cause the laws treated all foreign nations equally.5 2 Regardless of which
position each of the preceding cases espouses, they all endeavor, under
the command of Zschernig, to find a threshold level of permissible state
involvement in the field of foreign relations.
53
c. The History of the Massachusetts Burma Law
In 1996, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts enacted "an Act Regu-
lating State Contracts with Companies Doing Business with or in Burma
(Myanmar). 54 The law restricts the ability of Massachusetts and its agen-
cies to purchase goods or services from any entity engaging in business
50. See id. at 746.
51. See id. (discussing what First Circuit believes to be limits on Zschernies
holding).
52. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 56 (giving reasons why courts upheld state "buy-
American" statutes). See generally Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903,
913 (3d Cir. 1990) (upholding statute in part because it provides no opportunity
for state officials "to comment on, let alone key their decisions to, the nature of
foreign regimes"); K.S.B. Tech. Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply
Comm'n, 381 A.2d 774 (N.J. 1977) (holding that state "buy-American" statute does
not discriminate against different foreign nations). In Trojan Techs., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit commented that in upholding the
statute, it was clear that the buy-American statute "provide[d] no opportunity for
state administrative officials or judges to comment on, let alone key their decisions
to, the nature of foreign regimes," and there was no "indication ... that the statute
[had] been selectively applied according to the foreign policy attitudes of the
Commonwealth courts or ... Attorney General." Trojan Techs., 916 F.2d at 913.
53. Compare Tayyari v. New Mexico State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365, 1376-80
(D.N.M. 1980) (holding that university policy was impermissible because it could
affect international relations), and Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 80
Cal. Rptr. 800, 800 (Ct. App. 1969) (invalidating California Buy American Act as
impermissible encroachment on foreign affairs power of federal government), and
Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300, 307 (I11. 986)
(finding Illinois law "outside the realm of permissible state activity"), and New York
Times Co. v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 361 N.E.2d 963, 968
(N.Y. 1977) (holding that New York law was impermissible under Zschernig), with
Trojan Techs., 916 F.2d at 913-14 (upholding "buy-American" statute as permissi-
ble state activity), and Board of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement Sys. of Balti-
more v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 757 (Md. 1989) (finding
Baltimore ordinance permissible under Zschernig), and K.S.B. Technical, 381 A.2d at
782-84 (concluding that "buy-American" provisions do not represent kind of intru-
sion into foreign affairs condemned in Zschernig). As the preceding cases illustrate,
recognizing the precise scope of Zschernig has not been an easy task.
54. Ch. 130, 1996 Mass. Acts 239 (codified at MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 7, §§ 22G-
22M (West Supp. 1998)).
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with Burma. 55 Moreover, the law requires the Secretary of Administration
and Finance to compile and update a "restricted purchase list," comprised
of all companies engaged in business relations with Burma.
56
Under the law, three situations, if present, afford Massachusetts the
opportunity of doing business with a "restricted company."5 7 Practically
speaking then, a company on the restricted purchase list can sell to the
Commonwealth only if its bid is ten percent lower than the otherwise low-
est bid of a company not on the list.58 Before a company can pursue a
contract with the Commonwealth, it must provide an affidavit disclosing
any business ties it may have with Burma. 59 The law defines "doing busi-
ness with Burma" to include a variety of economic relationships, making
rare exceptions for entities "with operations in Burma (Myanmar) for the
sole purpose of reporting the news, or solely for the purpose of providing
goods or services for the provision of international telecommunica-
tions." 60 The law does not restrict the ability of private citizens or local
55. See id.; see also Natsios, 181 F.3d at 45 (discussing Massachusetts Burma
Law).
56. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 7, § 22J. Although the Act restricts the ability of
Massachusetts to do business with firms on the restricted purchase list, it does not
entirely prohibit it. See id. § 22H (listing three situations where Massachusetts can
lawfully contract with company on restricted purchase list).
57. See id. § 22H (listing three situations that afford Massachusetts opportu-
nity of doing business with company on restricted purchase list). Massachusetts
may, in its discretion, do business with any company on the "restricted purchase
list" "when: (1) the procurement of the bid or offer is essential and there is no
other bid or offer; (2) when the Commonwealth is purchasing certain medical
supplies; or (3) when there is no comparable low bid or offer." Id. The law de-
fines "comparable low bid or offer" as an offer equal to or less than 10% above a
low bid from a company on the restricted purchase list. Id. § 22G.
58. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 46 (discussing practical effect of Massachusetts
Burma Law),
59. See MASs. GEN. LAws ch. 7, § 22H (noting requirement that company dis-
close any business ties it has with Burma before doing business with Massachu-
setts); see also Natsios, 181 F.3d at 46 (discussing requirement that company provide
"a sworn declaration disclosing any business it is doing with Burma").
60. MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 7, § 22G. "[D]oing business with Burma" includes:
(a) [H]aving a principal place of business, place of incorporation or...
corporate headquarters in Burma (Myanmar) or having any opera-
tions, leases, franchises, majority-owner subsidiaries, distribution
agreements, or any other similar agreements in Burma (Myanmar),
or being the majority-owned subsidiary, licensee or franchise of such
a person;
(b) providing financial services to the government of Burma (Myanmar),
including providing direct loans, underwriting government securi-
ties, providing any consulting advice or assistance, providing broker-
age services, acting as a trustee or escrow agent, or otherwise acting
as an agent pursuant to a contractual agreement;
(c) promoting the importation or sale of gems, timber, oil, gas or other
related products, commerce in which is largely controlled by the gov-
ernment of Burma (Myanmar), from Burma (Myanmar);
(d) providing any goods or services to the government of Burma
(Myanmar).
[Vol. 45: p. 137
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municipalities to enter into business relations with companies doing busi-
ness with Burma. 61 Nevertheless, the law effectively forces businesses to
choose between doing business with Burma and availing themselves of
Massachusetts's two billion dollar procurement market.
62
Noticeably absent from the law is an express statement of purpose.
Nonetheless, the bill's cosponsor, Representative Byron Rushing, stated
that the law establishes a selective purchase program, which has as its
"identifiable goal" the pursuit of "free democratic elections in Burma."
63
Indeed, Massachusetts argued to the District Court for the District of Mas-
sachusetts that the law was enacted to express the Commonwealth's disap-
proval of the human rights violations committed in Burma, and not as a
measure designed to benefit the Commonwealth economically.
64
III. FACTS: THE EVENTS GMNG RISE TO National
Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios
On April 30, 1998, the NFTC filed suit, seeking declaratory and in-
junctive relief against two Massachusetts officials. 65 At the time the NFTC
filed its complaint there were 346 companies on the restricted purchase
list, 44 of which were United States companies.6 6 Coinciding with protests
Natsios, 181 F.3d at 46 (quoting MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 7, § 22G).
61. See Petition for Certiorari at 6-7, Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (No. 98-2304) (not-
ing that Massachusetts Burma Law does not apply to private citizens).
62. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 46 (noting practical effect of Massachusetts Burma
Law).
63. See id. (recounting statements of Massachusetts Burma Law sponsor as he
introduced bill to legislature). In his signing statement, then-Lieutenant Governor
Cellucci stated that he believed that the "steady flow of foreign investments, includ-
ing those of ... United States companies [into Burma]" enabled the junta in
Burma to procure weapons and establish itself as the legitimate government of
Burma. Id.
Additionally, then-Governor Weld commented that although one act by one
state alone (referring to the enactment of the Massachusetts Burma Law) would
not end the oppression and suffering of the Burmese people, it was his sincere
hope that other states and Congress would follow in Massachusetts' footsteps. See id.
(emphasis added). As a corollary, Congress indeed did follow suit when, three
months after the passage of the Massachusetts Burma Law, Congress enacted a law
imposing sanctions on Burma. See id. at 47 (citing Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009-
166 to 3009-167 (enacted by Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997,
Pub.L. No. 104-208, § 101(c), 110 Stat. 3009-121 to 3009-172 (1996)) ("Federal
Burma Law")). For a discussion of Congressional preemption of the Massachusetts
Burma Law, see infra note 78 and accompanying text.
64. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 46 (noting consistency of Massachusetts' conten-
tions that law was enacted to disavow human rights violations and presence of mili-
tary junta in Burma).
65. See id. at 48. The NFTC, founded in 1914 is a nonprofit corporation,
which has "long represented its members in foreign-trade matters." Brief for Ap-
pellee at 11, Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (No. 98-2304). At the time the complaint was
filed the NFTC represented over 540 member companies that engage in foreign
trade. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 48.
66. See Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 47.
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from several of the United States' trading partners, a number of compa-
nies withdrew their enterprises from Burma, with at least three citing the
Massachusetts Burma Law as the principal consideration in their deci-
sion. 67 In addition to Massachusetts, nineteen municipal governments en-
acted similar laws restricting business associations with companies doing
business with Burma-although Massachusetts remains the only state to
have enacted a selective purchasing law aimed at companies doing busi-
ness in or with Burma.68
On the international level, several foreign nations expressed objec-
tions to the Massachusetts Burma Law.69 Although the Association of
South East Asian Nations ("ASEAN") and Japan outwardly expressed their
concern to the federal government regarding the Massachusetts law, the
European Union andJapan were even more proactive, lodging complaints
with the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), condemning the law as a
violation of the United States' international obligations. 70
At the district court level, the NFTC challenged the Massachusetts
Burma Law on three grounds. 7 1 First, it claimed that the law unconstitu-
tionally interfered with the federal government's foreign affairs power.72
Next, it maintained that the law violated the Foreign Commerce Clause.73
Lastly, it argued that the Massachusetts law was preempted by the Federal
Burma Law.7 4 Although the district court found that the Massachusetts
67. See id. Protests have been forthcoming from a number of integral trading
partners, including the EU, Japan and the ASEAN. See id. at 47 (noting foreign
protests). For example, one EU executive noted the arrival of selective purchasing
laws on the scene as "an unwelcome development." E. U. Still Concerned Over U.S.
Trade Barriers, THE XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Sept. 9, 1999, at 1, available in LEXIS,
News Group File, Xinhua file. The official added that "this situation is not in line
with the open market access policy advocated by the U.S." Id.
68. See Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 47. Moreover, a number of local jurisdictions
have enacted similar laws pertaining to China, Cuba, Nigeria and other countries.
See id.; see also Appellee's Brief at 10, Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (No. 98-2304) (noting
that at present time, Massachusetts is only state or commonwealth to enact selec-
tive purchasing law pertaining to companies engaged in business in or with
Burma).
69. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 54 (considering protests received from EU and
ASEAN); see also Appellee's Brief at 10, Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (No. 98-2304) (discuss-
ing objections of several foreign governments and entities who have expressed dis-
may over Massachusetts Burma Law); Malhotra, supra note 16, at 40 (discussing
problems negotiating with allies created by Massachusetts Burma Law). For a fur-
ther discussion of the objections expressed by United States trading partners, see
supra note 67, infra note 70 and accompanying text.
70. See Appellee's Brief at 10, Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (No. 98-2304) (noting com-
plaints filed by EU and Japan with World Trade Organization ("WTO")); see also
Price & Hanna, supra note 19, at 445, 499 n.7 (same) (citing United States-Meas-
ures Affecting Government Procurement, Request for Consultations by the European Commu-
nities, WTO Doc. WT.DS88/1 (circulated June 26, 1997)).
71. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 48 (discussing challenge to Massachusetts Burma
Law in district court).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
[Vol. 45: p. 137
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Burma Law impermissibly encroached upon the foreign affairs power of
the federal government, it held that the NFTC had not met its burden of
showing that Congress preempted the Massachusetts Burma Law by enact-
ing the Federal Burma Law. 75 The district court did not pass on the argu-
ment advanced by the NFTC that the Massachusetts law violated the
Foreign Commerce Clause.76 The First Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling that the Massachusetts Burma Law unconstitutionally en-
croached on the federal government's exclusive power over foreign af-
fairs. 77 It further held that the law violated the Foreign Commerce Clause
and was preempted by federal law imposing sanctions on Burma. 78
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Narrative Analysis: A Unanimous Three-Judge Panel
Advances the Cause of Federalism
In striking down the Massachusetts Burma Law, the First Circuit be-
gan its analysis by reviewing Supreme Court precedent regarding the per-
missible level within which states may legislate in the foreign affairs
arena.79 Next, the court addressed the constitutionality of the Massachu-
setts Burma Law under the Foreign Commerce Clause.80 Thereafter, the
75. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 289, 293
(D. Mass. 1998) (holding that Massachusetts Burma Law impermissibly en-
croached upon foreign affairs power of federal government and that NFTC had
not met its burden of showing that Federal Burma Law preempted Massachusetts
Burma Law).
76. See id. at 293 (declining to consider NFTC's argument that Massachusetts
law violates Foreign Commerce Clause).
77. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 45 (holding that Massachusetts law interfered with
foreign affairs power of federal government).
78. See id. (holding that Massachusetts law violated Foreign Commerce Clause
and was preempted by Congress).
79. See id. at 49-61 (analyzing whether Massachusetts Burma Law impermissi-
bly impinges on foreign affairs power of federal government and concluding that
it does).
80. See id. at 61-71 (analyzing constitutionality of Massachusetts Burma Law
under Foreign Commerce Clause). Because a textual discussion of this aspect of
the court's holding is beyond the scope of this Note, the court's treatment of the
Foreign Commerce Clause challenge will accordingly be dealt with in this
footnote.
Massachusetts argued that it is a market participant (and not a regulator), and
that the market participant exception, as recognized by the Supreme Court in dor-
mant domestic Commerce Clause jurisprudence, should be applied to the Foreign
Commerce Clause. See id. at 62. Even if this exception does not apply, Massachu-
setts argued, the Massachusetts Burma Law is still not violative of the Foreign Com-
merce Clause. See id.
In its analysis, the court first found that Massachusetts was not acting as a
market participant when it acted pursuant to the Massachusetts Burma Law. See id.
at 62 (distinguishing White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S.
204 (1983)). In distinguishing White, the court noted that while White involved an
attempt to dictate the employment of Boston residents in projects funded by the
city, Massachusetts was attempting to impose on companies with which it does busi-
NOTE
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ness conditions unrelated to the companies' business relationship with Massachu-
setts. See id. at 62-63. Moreover, the court stated that the market participant
exception is a narrow one and should not be applied too broadly. See id. at 63
(citing Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 594
(1997)).
After concluding that Massachusetts was not acting as a market participant
when acting pursuant to the Massachusetts Burma Law, the court then stated that
it is unlikely that the exception even applied to the Foreign Commerce Clause. See
id. at 65. Nonetheless, the court left the conclusive resolution of this issue to an-
other day. See id.
In concluding its Foreign Commerce Clause analysis, the court found that the
critical inquiry was whether the Massachusetts Burma Law facially discriminated
against foreign commerce. See id. at 66. In support of its holding that the law was
facially discriminatory, the court relied on Supreme Court precedent to advance
the notion that a law need not be designed to further local economic interests in
order to run afoul of the Commerce clause. See id. at 67 (citing New Energy Co. v.
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 276 (1988), and Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue
& Fin., 505 U.S. 71, 79 (1992) (rejecting argument that local favoritism is crucial
to finding that law is facially discriminatory)). The court further found that the
law was a clear attempt to regulate the flow of foreign commerce. See id. at 67-68
(stating that Massachusetts Burma Law discriminated against foreign commerce in
two ways: by discriminating against companies or persons organized or operating
in Burma and against companies or persons doing business in Burma); see also
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983) (stating
that law would not be held invalid if it only had "foreign resonances") (emphasis
added); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448-49 (1979)
(stating that "[floreign commerce is preeminently a matter of national concern"
and recognizing need for "federal uniformity"). Using the above cases as a foun-
dation, the court found that Massachusetts' attempt to compel political change in
Burma through regulating the flow of foreign commerce was clearly more than
just resonances. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 68. Following this line of reasoning, the
court held that the Massachusetts Burma Law was facially discriminatory. See id.
The court further held that the Massachusetts Burma Law interfered with the
ability of the central government to speak with one voice. See id. Citing Container
Corp. and Japan Line as direct precedent, the court distinguished the "one voice"
test of Foreign Commerce Clause analysis from the similar, but distinct "one voice"
test used under Zscherni's foreign affairs power analysis. See id. In so holding, the
court found that the above cases "make clear that a state law can violate the dor-
mant Foreign Commerce Clause by impeding the federal government's ability to
'speak with one voice,' . . . because such state action harms 'federal uniformity in
an area where federal uniformity is essential."' Id. (quotingJapan Line, 441 U.S. at
448-49); see also Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 193. The court explicitly rejected the
Commonwealth's argument that the Massachusetts Burma Law did not violate the
Foreign Commerce Clause because the law did not distinguish between domestic
and foreign companies. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 67. Moreover, the court rejected
Massachusetts' argument that Barclays severely undercuts, if not completely dis-
poses of the Commerce Clause "one voice" test. See id. at 68-69. Finally, the court
found that in light of the findings above, Massachusetts failed to put forth a legiti-
mate local justification in support of its law. See id. at 70. Because it found that the
Massachusetts law discriminated on its face against foreign commerce, the court
noted that the law could survive constitutional scrutiny only if it "'advance[d] a
legitimate local purpose that [could not] be adequately served by reasonable non-
discriminatory alternatives."' Id. (quoting New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 278 (1988)).
The court found Massachusetts' argument that the expression of moral outrage
served this purpose to be unpersuasive, and it held that the Commonwealth had
failed to advance a legitimate local justification to save its law from constitutional
scrutiny. See id.
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court discussed whether Congress preempted the Massachusetts law by im-
posing its own sanctions on Burma.81 Finally, the court held that the law
81. See id. at 71-77 (analyzing whether Congress preempted Massachusetts
Burma Law by imposing its own sanctions on Burma). Like the court's holding
that the Massachusetts Burma Law violated the Foreign Commerce Clause, the
holding that the law was also preempted by the passage of the Federal Burma Law
is also beyond the scope of this Note. Therefore, the issue of federal preemption
will be discussed in this footnote.
In treating the issue of preemption, the court considered the NFTC's argu-
ment that the Massachusetts Burma Law was preempted by the Federal Burma
Law, and thus, a violation of the Supremacy Clause. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 71.
The court also considered the Commonwealth's response that Congress had im-
pliedly permitted the law, and regardless, that the federal sanctions did not pre-
empt its law. See id. The court rejected Massachusetts' claim that Congress
acquiesced to its law and found that Congress indeed preempted the Massachu-
setts Burma Law. See id.
In arguing that Congress implicitly permitted its law because of its failure to
explicitly preempt it, the Commonwealth relied on Barclays to advance its argu-
ment that when Congress is fully aware of a state's law, and fails to explicitly pre-
empt it, it has acquiesced to the validity of the law in question. See id. (citing
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 326-29 (1994)). In rejecting
the Commonwealth's argument, the court stated that "the posture of Congress
here is nothing like the position of Congress recounted in Barclays." Id. at 72.
Moreover, the court discounted Massachusetts' reliance on Barclays, distinguishing
the facts of Barclays from the facts present in this case. See id. The court gave a
number of reasons for believing that Barclays did not apply to the facts of this case.
See id.
First, the court noted that the discussion of preemption in Barclays came as
part of a Commerce Clause inquiry. See id. Unlike here, the court in Barclays did
not have occasion to discuss how courts should address Supremacy Clause chal-
lenges to state and local laws that impact on foreign affairs. See id. Second, the
court found that while Barclays involved an area of traditional state activity-in-
come taxation of companies that do business in the state and elsewhere-the law
in question had few direct foreign policy implications and was not designed to
affect conduct beyond the borders of the state. See id. The court's final reason for
distinguishing Barclays from this case is that although Barclays involved congres-
sional silence, Congress has not been silent with respect to Burma. See id. at 73.
Therefore, the court stated, the real question is not what is to be inferred from the
lack of congressional activity in the present case, but how to interpret what Con-
gress has already done with respect to Burma. See id.
In endeavoring to answer this question, the court examined the "usual indicia
of congressional intent" where Congress has failed to explicitly address the issue of
preemption. Id. The court determined that "[p]reemption will be more easily
found where states legislate in areas traditionally reserved to the federal govern-
ment, and .. .where state laws touch on foreign affairs." Id. The test the court
espoused can be found in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941), and devel-
oped in later cases. See id. The court interpreted the test to stand for the proposi-
tion that when an act of Congress touches a field in which the federal interest is so
dominant it will be deemed to preclude enforcement of similar state laws on the
same subject. See id. at 74 (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)
(noting that federal system precludes, in such instances, enforcement of state laws
on same subject); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978) (same); City
of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973) (same)).
The court rejected Massachusetts' argument that it was acting under its tradi-
tional state police powers, and it found that under Hines and its progeny, Congress
had preempted the Massachusetts Burma Law. See id. at 76 ("[W]hen Congress
15
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impermissibly encroached on the exclusive foreign affairs power of the
federal government, violated the Foreign Commerce Clause and was pre-
empted by Congress. 82
Laying the groundwork for its foreign affairs power analysis, the court
cited Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution for the
proposition that the Constitution granted Congress the power "[t]o regu-
late commerce with foreign Nations. '8 3 The court further cited a myriad
of other clauses that make up the foreign affairs provisions of the Constitu-
tion.8 4 In interpreting that language, the court concluded that the Consti-
tution's foreign affairs provisions have long been understood to vest power
over foreign affairs solely in the federal government.8 5 Indeed, as the
legislates in an area of foreign relations, there is a strong presumption that it in-
tended to preempt the field, in particular where the federal legislation does not
touch on a traditional area of state concern"). In so holding, the court consid-
ered, but apparently attached little weight to, amici curiae members of Congress,
who contended that "Congress [was] well aware of the criticism being directed at
the Massachusetts law and other state and local purchasing measures," but that
Congress' failure to address such measures, either when enacting federal sanctions
against Burma, or when it considered reforming federal sanctions law, was inten-
tional. See id. at 72 (citing H.R. 2708, 105th Cong. (1997)).
82. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 45 (holding, after de novo review, that Massachu-
setts Burma Law unconstitutionally encroached upon foreign affairs power of fed-
eral government, violated Foreign Commerce Clause and had been preempted by
Congress).
83. Id. at 49 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
84. See id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cls. 1, 4, 10 & 11 to demonstrate
powers granted to Congress by Constitution in matters relating to foreign affairs).
In addition, the court cited sections of Article II to note the foreign affairs power
bestowed on the President by the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cls. 1 &
2; Natsios, 181 F.3d at49 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cls. 1 & 2). Collectively, the
court endeavored to show the broad power conferred on the federal government
in the foreign affairs arena. See id. at 49 (discussing foreign affairs power vested in
federal government under Constitution).
Additionally, the court attempted to show the limited and restricted power
given to the states by the Constitution. See id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cls. 1,
2 for proposition that states may not act in specific foreign affairs matters without
consent of Congress).
85. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 49. From a historical perspective, James Madison
commented that "[i]f we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be
in respect to other nations." See id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 302 (James
Madison) (B.F. Wright ed., 1996). In its ambitious attempt to trace the power of
the federal government over foreign affairs back to the Framers, the First Circuit
cited Alexander Hamilton, who gave the following thoughts, discussing state regu-
lation of foreign commerce:
The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States, contrary to
the true spirit of the Union, have .. .given just cause of umbrage and
complaint to others, and it is to be feared that examples of this nature, if
not restrained by a national control, would be multiplied and extended
till they became not less serious sources of animosity and discord than
injurious impediments to the intercourse between different parts of the
[Nation].
Id. at 49-50 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 192 (Alexander Hamilton) (B.F.
Wright ed., 1996)).
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court noted, in the field of foreign affairs, state lines disappear and we are
but one nation.8 6 Nevertheless, the court recognized that a limited role in
foreign affairs is conferred on the states by the Constitution.8 7 Still, such
roles are narrowly defined and limited in both scope and subject matter.88
Although states may make some agreements and compacts with foreign
governments without Congress' approval, they cannot do so where those
agreements may infringe upon the authority or foreign relations power of
the United States.89
Thus, the central question the court considered was whether the Mas-
sachusetts law runs contrary to the federal foreign affairs power as inter-
preted in Zschernig.90  Although the court cited numerous cases
supporting its finding that the Massachusetts Burma Law impermissibly
encroaches on the federal government's foreign affairs power, no other
case was as instrumental in this part of the court's opinion as the Zschernig
decision.9 1 After recognizing that the "precise boundaries" of Zschernig
86. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) ("Power over external
affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclu-
sively."); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (stating that interest of entire
citizenry "imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign
relations be left entirely free from local interference"); United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) ("[l]n respect of our foreign relations generally, state
lines disappear."); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-
16 (1936) (recognizing that foreign affairs power of federal government is not
limited).
87. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 50 ("Federal dominion over foreign affairs does not
mean that there is no role for the states."). For example, states may, with the
consent of Congress, "lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports" when they
are "absolutely necessary for executing [their] inspection Laws." U.S. CONsT. art.
I, § 10, cl. 2. Moreover, states may, with the consent of Congress, "enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power .... U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Indeed, Massachusetts maintains in excess of 20 bilateral
agreements with sub-national foreign governments and trade organizations. See
Natsios, 181 F.3d at 50. As one scholar notes, states will inevitably encroach upon,
at least to some degree, the foreign relations power of the central government. See
id. (citing Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
162 (2d ed. 1996)).
88. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 50 (noting that under Constitution, states may
make agreements with foreign nations both with and without consent of Congress
in limited instances and confined subject matter) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 reporter's note 9 (1986)).
89. See id. (commenting that states may make some agreements with foreign
governments without Congress' consent, provided they do not encroach on au-
thority or foreign relations power of United States).
90. See id. at 50-51.
91. See id. (noting that central question is whether state law is inconsistent
with federal foreign affairs power as interpreted in Zschernig); David Schmahmann
& James Finch, The Unconstitutionality of State and Local Enactments in the United States
Restricting Business Ties With Burma (Myanmar), 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175, 198-
99 (1997) (discussing Zschernig as landmark case on subject of foreign affairs
power); David R. Schmahmann et al., Off the Precipice: Massachusetts Expands its For-
eign Policy Expedition From Burma to Indonesia, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1021, 1025
(1997) (same). Nonetheless, Zschernig has routinely been the subject of much
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are ambiguous, the court proceeded to consider the parties' arguments in
detail. 92 In agreeing with the district court that the Massachusetts Burma
Law is unconstitutional under Zschernig, the court disposed of the Com-
monwealth's two lines of attack challenging the lower court's ruling.93
Massachusetts first advanced the argument that Zschernig can be dis-
tinguished from this case based on their incongruous facts. 9 4 As a corol-
lary to this argument, Massachusetts argued that the Zschernig Court
recognized the need to balance the local state interests against the relative
possibility of harm flowing from state intrusion into foreign affairs. 95 The
Commonwealth's next argument challenged Zschernig itself, effectively ar-
guing that it is weak precedent.9 6 More specifically, Massachusetts con-
tended that the Court's decision in Barclays undercuts Zschernig and
renders it limited in scope. 9 7
In treating the Commonwealth's first argument, the court agreed
with Massachusetts that Zschernig left intact Clark v. Allen.98 The court
then decided whether the Massachusetts Burma Law had more than an
"incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries." 99 After stating that the
Massachusetts law clearly had more than an "incidental or indirect effect
in foreign countries," the court declined to read Zschernig as requiring
courts to balance the nation's interests in a uniform foreign policy against
the interests of an individual state. 10 0
Instead, the court asserted, Zschernig stands for the principle that
"there is a threshold level of involvement in and impact on foreign affairs
which the states may not exceed."10 1 In concluding that the Massachusetts
law has more than an incidental or indirect effect on foreign relations, the
scholarly debate. See Loschin & Anderson, supra note 28, at 403-04 (noting that
commentators have searched for Zschernigs meaning since it was decided).
92. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 51-52. Because the district court ruled on cross-
motions for summary judgment, based on stipulated facts and uncontested affida-
vits, the decision turned entirely on questions of law. As such, the First Circuit
reviewed the district court's determinations de novo. See id. at 49. Because the
parties' arguments raised issues of first impression, the First Circuit discussed them
in great detail. See id. at 52.
93. See id. at 52-59 (addressing, then subsequently disposing of Massachusetts'
arguments that lower court erred below).
94. See id. at 52.
95. See id. Of course, Massachusetts further argued that under this test the
balance favors the Massachusetts Burma Law withstanding constitutional scrutiny.
See id.
96. See id.
97. See id. (citing Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994)).
The NFTC countered by claiming that the Massachusetts Burma Law is a far
greater intrusion into foreign affairs than the law at issue in Zschernig and that
Massachusetts is, for all practical purposes, asking the First Circuit to overrule
Zschernig. See id.
98. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
99. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 52 (quoting Clark, 331 U.S. at 517).
100. Id.
101. Id. As the Court in Zschernig stated:
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court cited a combination of factors that lead to this result.10 2 First, the
court noted that the design and intent of the Massachusetts law is to affect
the affairs of a specific foreign country (Burma). 10 3 Second, the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts is in a position to effectuate that design and
intent and, in fact, has had an effect. 10 4 Third, the effects of the law may
prove even greater if Massachusetts ends up being a "bellwether" for other
states and local governments.10 5 Fourth, the law has been the subject of
repeated complaints from foreign governments, the ASEAN and the Euro-
pean Union ("EU"). 10 6 Finally, Massachusetts has charted a course diver-
gent from the federal law in at least five ways, creating the potential of
embarrassment for the United States.10 7
In discussing the preceding factors, the court initially noted that the
first two factors are evident from its recitation of the facts of the case.' 0 8
The court then stated that the fifth factor is treated adequately in its pre-
emption analysis. 10 9 The court then turned its discussion to the third and
fourth factors mentioned above. 110
In combining the two factors, the court determined that the threat to
the foreign affairs power of the federal government is amplified when the
Commonwealth is viewed as only a small part of a "broader pattern of state
and local intrusion.""' The court concluded that under Zschernig, the ef-
fect of state and local laws cannot be viewed in isolation; courts con-
The several States, of course, have traditionally regulated the descent and
distribution of estates. But those regulations must give way if they impair
the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy .... [E]ven in ab-
sence of a treaty, a State's policy may disturb foreign relations.
Id. at 52-53 (citing Zschernigv. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968)). The court went
on to note that Zschernig did not hold, contrary to Massachusetts' contention, that
a strong state interest could overcome an otherwise impermissible encroachment
on the federal government's foreign affairs power. See id. at 53.
102. See id. at 52-53 (concluding that Massachusetts Burma Law fails effects
test of Clark and Zschernig).
103. See id. at 53.
104. See id. For a discussion of the effects of the Massachusetts Burma Law,
see supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
105. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 53.
106. See id.
107. See id. This and the above four factors should be considered together,
and their cumulative effect is determinative of whether the law has more than an
incidental or indirect effect on foreign relations. See id.
108. See id. (disposing of first two factors as apparent from discussion of facts).
For a further discussion of the facts of this case, see supra notes 65-78 and accom-
panying text.
109. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 53. For a discussion of the court's preemption
analysis, see supra note 81 and accompanying text.
110. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 53-54 (discussing effects of Massachusetts Burma
Law acting as "bellwether" for other state and local governments, and effect of
foreign protests having potential to create disruption or embarrassment for United
States).
111. Id. at 53. Additionally, the court noted that other municipalities have
passed similar laws, whether targeting Burma or another country. See id. More-
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ducting this analysis should consider the cumulative effects of similar laws
in other jurisdictions. 1 12 The court also considered the protests raised by
the EU, the ASEAN and other foreign governments. 113 In response to
these types of protests, the court concluded that such objections are evi-
dence of the "great potential for disruption or embarrassment caused by
the Massachusetts law." 1 4 This potential for embarrassment, together
with the other factors mentioned above, drove the court to conclude that
the Massachusetts Burma Law has more than an "incidental or indirect
effect" on foreign relations and, as such, is an impermissible intrusion into
the foreign affairs power of the federal government. 11
5
In considering Massachusetts' second argument, that Zschernig has
been undercut by subsequent Supreme Court decisions, in particular the
Barclays decision, the court reviewed the cases cited by Massachusetts and
found that no decision by the Court, including Barclays, suggested that
Zschernig is not fully binding on the present case.' 16 In setting forth its
argument, the Commonwealth relied on a wide range of authority, includ-
over, the court stated, "amici inform us that other states and large cities are waiting
in the wings." Id.
112. See id. (announcing standard mandated by Zschernig for conducting ef-
fects test).
113. See id. at 54 (citing protests from United States' allies and trading part-
ners). An EU official commented that the Massachusetts Burma Law is "an attack
on international law." Id. Similarly, an ASEAN official remarked that the ASEAN
is "dismayed by this trend [of sub-national laws targeting Burma], because you
cannot negotiate with states and provinces." Id.
114. Id. In giving credence to the potential for embarrassment to the United
States that these protestations evince, the court concurrently rejected Massachu-
setts' claim that such statements should be ignored. See id. In Zschernig, statements
akin to the current ones were made by Bulgaria, to which the Court issued weight
as evidence that the law was affecting foreign relations, and posing a "great poten-
tial for disruption or embarrassment." 389 U.S. 429, 435, 436-37 (1968).
In support of its claim that the court should ignore foreign government objec-
tions, Massachusetts noted that the federal law implementing the Uruguay Round
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) denies foreign govern-
ments the right to challenge state laws based on the GATT. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at
54. The court found this argument misplaced, because this case was not brought
pursuant to the GATT, or any other WTO agreement. See id.
Massachusetts also contended that Barclays rejected the need to rely on the
views of trading partners. See id. The court rejected this argument, concluding
that although the Court in Barclays found foreign government views to be unper-
suasive, it still considered them. See id. at 54-55. Reading Zschernig and Barclays
together, the court determined that they stand for the proposition that "foreign
government views, although not dispositive, are one factor to consider in deter-
mining whether a law impermissibly interferes with the federal government's for-
eign affairs power." Id. at 55.
115. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 55 (concluding that because Massachusetts Burma
Law has more than incidental or indirect effects, it is impermissible under
Zschernig s effects test).
116. See id. at 56-59 (finding that no subsequent Supreme Court opinions,
including Barclays, undercuts Zschernig and suggests that it is not binding on this
case).
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ing cases and academic commentary."17 Despite recognizing the ambigu-
ity of Zschernig, the court concluded that neither post-Zschernig cases nor
scholarly debate excuse lower courts from applying opinions that are still
good law.118
In interpreting the subsequent case law that Massachusetts cited in
support of its argument, the court noted that Zschernig is most often cited
for the proposition that the federal government's foreign affairs power is
plenary, or that cases in United States courts that involve foreign govern-
ments "raise sensitive issues of foreign affairs." 1 9 Although Zschernig has
been distinguished by the Court on at least one occasion, the First Circuit
believed that such action by the Court did not dilute the holding in
Zschernig.'20 Indeed, as the court explained, "Zschernig remains '[t]he only
117. See id. The court framed the debate in the following manner:
One commentator... contends that Barclays stands for the proposition
that courts should not weigh the effects of a state law on foreign relations,
that Barclays undercuts claims that Massachusetts is interfering with the
federal government's ability to speak with one voice, and that Barclays
indicates that the Court will presume congressional tolerance of laws that
touch on foreign affairs issues, in particular if foreign governments object
to the state law in question.
Id. at 58 n.13 (citing Goldsmith, supra note 28, at 1700-01). On the other hand,
the court cited Professor Koh, who contested Professor Goldsmith's interpretation,
and argued that it would be a mistake to read too much into Barclays. See id. (citing
Koh, supra note 28, at 1848 for proposition that it would be wrong to read too
much into Barclays). Professor Koh noted that "the Solicitor General backed Cali-
fornia's argument that there was no conflict between the state's tax laws amd fed-
eral policy." Id. (citing Koh, supra note 28, at 1848). "'Thus, the case reveals less
about the Supreme Court's view of federalism than about the Court's traditional
judicial deference to the executive branch in foreign affairs."' Id. (quoting Koh,
supra note 28, at 1848).
118. See id. at 59. In recounting the role of the lower federal courts in the
judicial process, the court reported with force its mandate to follow Supreme
Court precedent. See id. (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (stat-
ing that lower courts have been "admonished . . . to follow [the Court's] directly
applicable precedent, even if that precedent appears weakened by pronounce-
ments in its subsequent decisions, and to leave to the Court 'the prerogative of
overruling its own decisions"')).
119. Id. at 57. In analyzing the effect subsequent decisions have had on
Zschernig, the court referred to a representative sampling of cases that cited to
Zschernig. See id. (looking to impact subsequent Supreme Court decisions have had
on Zscernig); see, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493
(1983) ("Actions against foreign sovereigns in our courts raise sensitive issues con-
cerning . . . foreign relations .... and the primacy of federal concerns is
evident.").
120. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 57 (stating that although Zschering had been dis-
tinguished, its holding was not diluted). Although the Court distinguished
Zschernig in First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972),
the Court apparently considered it to have left the pertinent part of Zschernig in-
tact. See id. (stating that plurality distinguished Zschernigby noting that in Zschernig
"the Court struck down an Oregon statute that was held to be 'an intrusion by the
State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the Presi-
dent and the Congress'") (plurality opinion, Rehnquist, J.) (quoting Zschernig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968)).
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case in which the Supreme Court has struck down a state statute as viola-
tive of the foreign affairs power' of the federal government. " 12 1
In analyzing the effect of Barclays on Zschernig, the court stated that
Barclays is inapplicable to the foreign affairs power argument because it
did not consider the reach of the foreign affairs power and did not cite
Zschernig at all.1 22 Moreover, Barclays reaffirmed that the primacy of the
federal government's ability to speak with one voice on foreign affairs does
not mean that Congress is obliged to act, or similarly, that states can never
act in an area as circumscribed as foreign affairs. 123 Massachusetts further
contended that Barclays stands for the principle that Congress, and not the
courts, is the only body that should ever determine whether a state law
interferes with the foreign affairs power of the federal government. 124
The court rejected Massachusetts' interpretation of Barclays' impact in the
foreign affairs power analysis for two reasons. 125 First, the court found
that Barclays did not involve a state law targeting any foreign nation or
nations, and there was no claim that the state in Barclays was engaging in
foreign policy through its tax system. 126 Indeed, as the court stated, Bar-
clays merely involved claims that the state law at issue violated the Com-
merce and Due Process Clauses. 127 The court contrasted this scenario
with the present case, which involved a law impacting one foreign nation,
121. Id. (quoting International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Locke, 148 F.3d
1053, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998)).
122. See id. (stating that Massachusetts' reliance on Barclays to support its ar-
gument that its law does not impermissibly encroach upon foreign affairs power of
federal government is misplaced). Also, the First Circuit emphasized that the
Court in Barclays did not cite to Zschernig at all, even though the parties themselves
cited it repeatedly in their briefs and at oral argument. See id. at 59.
123. See id. at 57 (noting that federal dominion over foreign affairs does not
demand that Congress act, nor does it preclude states from acting). The court
further alluded to a similar line of reasoning, present in Wardair Canada Inc. v.
Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986), where the Court found that a state tax
law did not impede the federal government's ability to speak with one voice. See id.
In Wardair, the Court stated:
[T]he Federal Government is entitled in its wisdom to act to permit the
States varying degrees of regulatory authority. [W]e never suggested in
[Japan Line] or in any other [case] that the Foreign Commerce Clause
insists that the Federal Government speak with any particular voice.
Natsios, 181 F.3d. at 58 (quoting Wardair, 477 U.S. at 12-13).
124. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 58. The court noted that this argument, advanced
by the Commonwealth, "echoes academic debate over whether Barclays undercuts
Zschernig or not." Id. For a further discussion of this scholarly debate, see supra
notes 28 & 117 and accompanying text.
125. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 59.
126. See id.
127. See id. (stating that Barclays did not reach foreign affairs question). The
court continued, stating that the Court's discussion of congressional inaction was
treated only with respect to the "'speak with one voice' prong of the Foreign Com-
merce Clause analysis, a prong that the court reached only after concluding that
the law was not otherwise unconstitutional." Id. For a further discussion of the
Court's treatment of congressional inaction in this context, see supra note 123 &
infra note 150 and accompanying text.
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and a claim that the Massachusetts law violated the foreign affairs power of
the federal government.1 2
8
The second reason the court rejected Massachusetts' interpretation of
Barclays' impact involved the lack of reference to Zschernig in Barclays.129
The court interpreted this omission to signify the Court's desire to keep
separate the "analyses that apply when examining laws under the Foreign
Commerce Clause and under the foreign affairs power." 130 In short, the
court rejected the remainder of Massachusetts' preliminary arguments,
and it found that Zschernig remained directly applicable to the facts of this
case and was not diluted by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.' 3 ' As
such, the court found that the Massachusetts Burma Law impermissibly
encroached upon the foreign affairs power of the federal government
and, thus, was unconstitutional.'3 2
B. Critical Analysis: The First Circuit Emerges Triumphantly After a Long
and Torturous March Through Ambiguous Supreme Court Precedent
After ciphering through a train of Supreme Court ambiguity, the First
Circuit reached the most reasonable decision possible to protect the integ-
rity of the federal government in controlling the foreign affairs of the
United States. 133 Although the First Circuit's constitutional analysis can
128. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 59 (noting differences between Barclays and pres-
ent case).
129. See id. (discussing Supreme Court's decision to omit from Barclays any
references to Zschernig holding).
130. Id.
131. See id. (stating that Zschernig remains good law and binding on lower
courts). The court further rejected Massachusetts' contention that the market par-
ticipant exception applies to the foreign affairs power. See id. at 59-60. Similarly,
the court summarily disposed of the Commonwealth's argument that the Tenth
and First Amendments shield the Massachusetts Burma Law from constitutional
scrutiny. See id. at 60-61. Unfortunately, all three arguments, and their treatment
thereof by the court, are beyond the scope of this Note.
132. See id. at 45 (holding that Massachusetts Burma Law unconstitutionally
impinges on federal foreign affairs power).
133. See Dewey, supra note 5, at A19 (noting that First Circuit "interprets not
one, but several, ambiguous Supreme Court decisions"). One of the most vexing
aspects of increased involvement in international affairs by state and local govern-
ments is the practical problems it raises for the United States in striving to put
forth a uniform foreign policy. See Malhotra, supra note 16, at 41 (noting that state
and local forays into domain of foreign affairs have implications for relationship
between United States and world at large); see also Schmahmann & Finch, supra
note 91, at 204-07 (stating that "[t]here are at least three major problems with
local governments in the United States purporting to make and implement the
nation's foreign policy"). First, the United States, in the aggregate, has diverse and
varied concerns that could be affected by state and local legislation-legislation
that has repercussions far beyond the "localities" in which it was enacted. See id. at
204. Second, although the federal government makes foreign policy decisions
only after consultation with a variety of organizations and networks designed to
handle such issues, it is doubtful whether state and municipal governments have at
their side the expert resources with which to make an informed, calculated deci-
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be justified as internally accurate, the Barclays decision creates troubled
waters, through which the court must wade to find the only sensible reso-
lution to this question.13 4 If Zschernig had a clear and definite scope, and
subsequent cases and commentary did not question its precedential value,
the court would have had the overwhelming support of both law and pol-
icy on its side.1
3 5
Although cases such as Barclays make for a more challenging legal
analysis than the tenor of the First Circuit alludes, as a matter of constitu-
tional dogma, the court's analysis is proper.' 3 6 Although the court's result
appears compelled by factors not explicitly denoted by its opinion, the
holding was rightly crafted to conform to prior Supreme Court prece-
dent.13 7 In distinguishing Barclays and other post-Zschernig decisions, the
court took the necessary step in striking down a law, which if allowed to
stand, could have spelled chaos for the federal government's ability to sat-
isfy its international obligations.' 3 8
Despite the Natsios court's appropriate determination that the Massa-
chusetts Burma Law impermissibly encroached upon the foreign affairs
power of the federal government, as interpreted in Zschernig, the court's
analysis was not without its share of deficiencies. 1 39 One of the most vex-
ing problems the court aimed to deal with, but inevitably perpetuated, was
clarifying the scope of the Zschernig effects test. 1 40 In adjudging that the
sion. See id. at 205. These, and other factors, lead to the conclusion that "state and
local governments are inappropriate bodies for foreign policymaking." Id. at 204.
134. See Trachtman, supra note 2, at 356 (noting that Barclays "illustrates a
shift toward greater deference to state law"); see also Goldsmith, supra note 28, at
1700-01 (contending that Barclays undercuts Zschernig and claiming that Massachu-
setts is interfering with federal government's ability to speak with one voice). But
see Koh, supra note 28, at 1848 (arguing that it would be erroneous to read too
much into Court's statements in Barclays).
135. For a discussion of the policy supporting the First Circuit's decision in
Natsios, see infra notes 158, 160, 168-169 and accompanying text.
136. For a further discussion of the First Circuit's analysis, see supra notes 79-
135 & infra notes 137-52 and accompanying text.
137. For a further discussion of the First Circuit's treatment of directly appli-
cable precedent, see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
138. See Malhotra, supra note 16, at 39 (noting that "selective purchasing laws"
undermine agreements United States made with foreign governments under
GATT). For example, as the EU and Japanese protests illustrate, laws of this na-
ture violate the Government Procurement Agreement that prohibits any sort of
discriminatory action against foreign companies that is not based solely on per-
formance or cost. See id.
139. For a further discussion of the deficiencies of the First Circuit's analysis
of Zschernig's effects test, see infra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
140. See Dewey, supra note 5, at A19 (stating that First Circuit "may fairly be
criticized for articulating a broad rule that would bar virtually any substantive in-
volvement by states in foreign affairs"). The Supreme Court's decision in Zschernig
has long been criticized for its ambiguity. See National Foreign Trade Council v.
Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 51-52 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (U.S. Nov.
29, 1999); see also HENKIN, supra note 27, at 164 (illustrating ambiguity of
Zschernig); Dewey, supra note 5, at A19 (noting ambiguous Supreme Court prece-
dent). As Professor Henkin remarks:
[Vol. 45: p. 137
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 14
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol45/iss1/14
Massachusetts Burma Law had more than an incidental or indirect effect
in foreign countries, the court considered five factors, the analysis of
which bore heavily on the court's conclusion.1 41 Although the analysis of
these factors attempted to demystify the line between permissible and im-
permissible sub-national actor involvement in foreign affairs, it is question-
able whether it accomplished this goal.
142
First, the factors that the court considered can be summarized in the
following manner: (1) intent to affect the affairs of a foreign country; (2)
ability to effectuate that intent and actual evidence that such an effect has
been realized; (3) the cumulative effect that a law may have if proven to be
a "bellwether" for other states and local governments; (4) protests of for-
eign governments and entities; and (5) prospects of embarrassment for
the United States. 143 The court suggested that a combination of these
factors dictates whether the Massachusetts law has more than an incidental
or indirect effect on foreign relations.1 4 4 Unfortunately, the court did not
make clear the relative weight to be attached to each individual factor, or
the number of factors that need to be present to support a finding that the
law has more than the permissible effect on foreign relations. 145 This lack
It may prove that Zschernig v. Miller excludes only state actions that reflect
a state policy critical of foreign governments and involve "sitting in judg-
ment" on them.... Or was the Court suggesting different lines-be-
tween state acts that impinge on foreign relations only "indirectly or
incidentally" and those that do so directly or purposefully?
HENKIN, supra note 27, at 164.
141. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 53, 55 (listing five factors it considered and con-
cluding that Massachusetts Burma Law had more than "incidental or indirect ef-
fect" on foreign relations).
142. See id. at 51-52 (noting Zscherni's ambiguity, but nonetheless finding
Massachusetts Burma Law unconstitutional under its presumed mandate). At the
district court level, the court failed to articulate the manner in which the Massa-
chusetts Burma Law ran afoul of Zschernig's effects test. Specifically, the court
failed to note the various ways in which the law had more than an incidental or
indirect effect in foreign countries. See Recent Cases, Foreign Affairs Power-The
Massachusetts Burma Law is Found to Encroach on the Federal Government's Exclusive
Constitutional Authority to Regulate Foreign Affairs-National Foreign Trade Council
v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998), 112 HARV. L. REv. 2013, 2014 (1999)
(discussing missed opportunity to clarify current foreign affairs jurisprudence re-
garding state and local involvement in foreign relations). Although the First Cir-
cuit improved upon the district court's decision to some extent by listing the
factors it considered in determining that the Massachusetts Burma Law had more
than an incidental or indirect effect, these factors did little more to elucidate
Zschernig s effects test than did the district court's analysis. For a further discussion
of the shortcomings of the factors considered by the First Circuit, see supra notes
140-41, & infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
143. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 53 (stating that conclusion that Massachusetts
Burma Law has more than incidental or indirect effect on foreign relations is dic-
tated by combination of five factors "present here").
144. See id.
145. See generally id. A careful review of the record indicates the First Circuit's
decision to exclude from its analysis the relative weight it attached to the above
mentioned factors, when deciding that the Massachusetts Burma Law had more
than an incidental or indirect effect on foreign relations. See id.
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of clarity may adversely affect future applications of Zschernig's effects test,
creating a blanket rule eliminating virtually all state participation in for-
eign affairs-a conclusion clearly contrary to the spirit of Zschernig.
1 4 6
Nevertheless, the court's treatment of the third and fourth factors
mentioned above recognized the critical need to preclude the advance-
ment of state and local laws that creep alarmingly close to a level of in-
volvement in international affairs that subjects the federal government to
the risk of breaching its international obligations. 14 7 Although the court
did not expressly quantify the importance it placed on such practical mat-
ters, the opinion is replete with signals that evince the court's concern
with the frequency with which similar laws have been fashioned and the
form that foreign protests could take. 148 Notwithstanding the opinion of
some commentators that the court's opinion turns on its preemption anal-
ysis, this interpretation is misplaced. 149 Although congressional action in
146. See HENKIN, supra note 27, at 165 n.2 (stating that Zschernig may have no
future value); see also Dewey, supra note 5, at A19 (stating that First Circuit's analy-
sis can be fairly criticized as creating overly broad rule, effectively prohibiting all
state and local involvement in foreign relations). Even commentators opposed to
legislation such as the Massachusetts Burma Law recognize that states do indeed
have a role to play in the conduct of the nation's foreign affairs. See Price &
Hannah, supra note 19, at 458 (" Zschernig makes clear that simply because a statute
has some collateral effect on foreign affairs does not mean it will automatically be
invalidated.").
147. For a discussion of the risk to the United States of breaching its interna-
tional obligations, see supra notes 133 & 138, & infra notes 160-70 and accompany-
ing text.
148. See generally Natsios, 181 F.3d 38. The court specifically addressed the
harm that could result if the Massachusetts law proved to be a precursor of similar
laws in other jurisdictions. See id. at 53-54 (discussing threat to federal foreign
affairs power magnified when Massachusetts is viewed as part of broader pattern of
state and local intrusion). Moreover, the court considered in detail the protests
received from foreign governments and organizations. See id. (noting that protests
are evidence of potential for disruption or embarrassment caused by Massachusetts
Burma Law). An example of the force of foreign protests can be seen from threats
by the EU and Japan to file complaints with the WTO, challenging the law as a
violation of the Government Procurement Agreement of the GATT treaty. See
Malhotra, supra note 16, at 40 (discussing possible impact of state and local intru-
sion into foreign affairs arena); Price & Hannah, supra note 19, at 499 n.7 (discuss-
ing impact and citing United States-Measures Affecting Government Procurement,
Request for Consultations by the European Communities, WTO Doc. WT.DS88/1 (circu-
lated June 26, 1997)). For a further discussion of the risk that such laws pose to
the United States' international obligations, see supra notes 133 & 138, & infra
notes 160-70 and accompanying text.
149. See Dewey, supra note 5, at A19 (stating that "[p]erhaps most impor-
tant ... the court believed that the Burma Law conflicted with the federal sanc-
tions regime"). Although obviously a significant part of the First Circuit's opinion,
the most lengthy and first treated basis for its holding was the contention that the
Massachusetts Burma Law impermissibly encroached on the foreign affairs power
of the federal government. See generally Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (treating foreign af-
fairs power issue for 13 pages and preemption analysis for only 6 pages). More-
over, the court below felt it adequate to dispose of the case by reaching only the
foreign affairs power issue, finding that the NFTC did not meet its burden of prov-
ing preemption. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287,
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this case was important, it is only one factor the court considered in apply-
ing Zscherni's effects test.1 50
Even though the court's application of Zschernig's effects test is prob-
lematic, the result obtained is proper. The problems associated with ana-
lyzing whether a law has an incidental or indirect effect on foreign
relations are a product of the inherent ambiguity of Zschernig itself.15 1
The First Circuit's analysis, though flawed, may be the most powerful evi-
dence that a definitive resolution to the issue of the permissible level of
sub-national actor participation in foreign affairs is necessary. 152
V. IMPACT: THE UNITED STATES CAN ILL-AFFORD STATE INVOLVEMENT
IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO JEOPARDIZE ITS
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
In striking down the Massachusetts Burma Law, the First Circuit pro-
tected the integrity of the federal government in managing the nation's
foreign relations and set a clear example that state legislation that creates
needless risks to the United States' performance of its international obliga-
tions will not be tolerated. 153 Although increased globalization ostensibly
creates the inference that states should have more maneuverability in the
international arena, that conclusion is misplaced and overly broad.' 54
293 (D. Mass. 1998) (finding that Massachusetts Burma Law unconstitutionally in-
fringed on foreign affairs power of federal government).
150. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 329 (1994)
(reaffirming that congressional action is not necessary to support finding that state
or local law impermissibly impinged on foreign affairs power of federal govern-
ment); Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1986)
(finding that "Federal Government is entitled in its wisdom to act to permit the
States varying degrees of regulatory authority," but such action is not necessary to
support finding that legislation unconstitutionally interferes with federal govern-
ment's foreign affairs power). These cases appear to suggest that although con-
gressional action is to be considered as part of the foreign affairs analysis, the lack
thereof is not dispositive.
151. For a discussion of Zschernigs ambiguity, see supra notes 133-34 and ac-
companying text.
152. See Dewey, supra note 5, at A19 (noting that whether Massachusetts or
any state or municipality can engage in foreign policy is question that deserves
definitive answer). Moreover, Frank Kittredge, president of the NFTC, said that if
the Supreme Court grants Certiorari, "then that has very serious implications," and
they are "looking forward to seeing how it comes out." State Attorney General Seeks
Review of Burma Trade Ruling, BOSTON GLOBE, July 13, 1999, at B5. Massachusetts'
Attorney General, Thomas F. Reilly commented that "it's important to continue to
defend the law, [because it is] about the state's right to choose who it does busi-
ness with." Id. Given the rise in the number of state and local governments in-
volved in the foreign affairs arena, a Supreme Court decision could affect scores of
sub-national actors with economic boycotts aimed at protesting perceived social or
political inequities around the world. See id.
153. For a further discussion of the potential harm to the United States' for-
eign relations created by the Massachusetts Burma Law, see infra notes 158 & 160-
70 and accompanying text.
154. For a further discussion of the detrimental effects of increased state and
local participation in foreign affairs, see infra notes 158-74 and accompanying text.
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Although there remains the need for sub-national actor participation in
foreign affairs, once it surpasses the threshold of permissible involvement,
it goes too far. 155 When the foreign policy of state and local actors subject
the nation to the risk of breaching its international obligations, there can
be no doubt that such activism must be quashed. 156
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the possible impact of the First Cir-
cuit's decision in Natsios is to explore the possible ramifications of the con-
trary holding.15 7 Commentators are split as to the proper role of state and
local actors in international affairs.' 58 Although some view Zschernig as a
product of the Cold War era and inapplicable to a modern society with
increased globalization, others argue that state involvement in sensitive
issues of foreign affairs creates the risk that one or more state actors may
unilaterally induce the entire country to breach its international obliga-
tions. 159 Despite the fear of imminent hostilities that plagued the era in
which Zschernig was decided, today's realities call even more earnestly for a
155. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 50 (1st Cir.
1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1999) (noting limited role for
states in foreign affairs, but state law that runs afoul of federal foreign affairs power
as interpreted in Zschernig must give way to power of federal government).
156. For a discussion of the risk that the United States faces of breaching its
international obligations, created by increased state and local actor involvement in
foreign affairs, see infra notes 160 & 168 and accompanying text.
157. For a discussion of the possible impact of holding that the Massachusetts
Burma Law and similarly situated laws are permissible under Zschernig, see infra
notes 158-74 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Malhotra, supra note 16, at 38-41 (arguing that rapid expansion
of states' roles in foreign policy not only complicates and confuses federal foreign
policy, but undermines U.S. relations with other nations as well); Price & Hannah,
supra note 19, at 499 (concluding that in matters of foreign affairs, "experimenta-
tion by states poses serious risks"). But see Carvajal, supra note 27, at 274 (stating
that "[a]s spenders of... taxpayer's dollars, states and localities have the constitu-
tional right to decide how and with whom to participate in the market . . .").
Nonetheless, Carvajal concedes that the exercise of this right is unclear. See id.
(stating that "[t]hough the extent of this right is unclear, it cannot automatically
be foreclosed"). It merits mentioning, however, that those who oppose state in-
volvement in foreign affairs, do so only when such involvement passes the thresh-
old of permissible participation. See Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 91, at 199
(noting that local action may pass constitutional muster if it has legitimate purpose
and only has incidental or indirect effect on foreign relations). For a further dis-
cussion supporting the constitutionality of selective purchasing laws, see generally
Loschin & Anderson, supra note 28.
159. See Spiro, supra note 2, at 1223-27 (stating that since end of Cold War
and institution of democratic peace worldwide, "the stakes have diminished," mak-
ing reliance on threats to national security unacceptable basis for arguing that
foreign affairs power vests exclusively in federal government). For a discussion
concerning commentators who feel that increased state and local involvement in
the foreign affairs arena will pose an increased risk to the United States' ability to
fulfill its international obligations, see supra note 158, & infra notes 160-70 and
accompanying text.
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doctrine that precludes the fashioning of laws, such as the Massachusetts
Burma Law, which put the Union at risk of international humiliation.
1 6 1
To understand the magnitude of the potential impact that state and
local actions may have, it is necessary to appreciate the reach of such
laws. 161 To be sure, these statutes are not simply vehicles through which
"paltry" governments express their dismay with the policies of certain for-
eign governments. 162 On the contrary, they are persuasive legislative tools
that have the potential to foster real change.163 Indeed, some sub-na-
tional measures are realizing their goals of creating social and political
change through altering economic activities within the foreign nations
that are the subject of the legislation. 164 The potential consequences for
160. See Malhotra, supra note 16, at 40 (discussing detrimental effects state
and local actions are having on U.S. foreign policy). For example, when Undersec-
retary for Economic Affairs, Stuart Eizenstat, attempted to discuss measures against
Burma with EU officials recently, he received a less than warm reception. See id.
(illustrating EU's disapproval of Massachusetts Burma Law by showing less than
warm reception for Undersecretary Eizenstat). Indeed, some EU officials refused
even to discuss the issue until the federal government "disposed of the Massachu-
setts law." Id. Moreover, local actions have the potential to adversely affect arenas
"wholly unrelated to the nation or problem targeted." Id. For instance, recent
talks about holding a new round of negotiations to expand the coverage of the
GATT" might deteriorate if foreign governments feel that such agreements will not
be enforced within states or municipalities. See id. at 40-41. As a more general
matter, the U.S. has repeatedly sought to shore up rules of international trade in
an effort to protect U.S. companies from discrimination. See id. at 41 (stating irony
that U.S. has sought to obtain favorable international trade laws to protect U.S.
companies from discrimination). But, if state and local laws start "demanding ex-
ceptions to established rules," it may prove exceedingly difficult for the U.S. to
obtain leverage in its pursuit to protect U.S.-based companies. Id.
161. See Malhotra, supra note 16, at 40 (noting potential of such laws to drive
change in international arena). In looking at the Massachusetts Burma Law alone,
the law compelled companies such as Kodak, Hewlett-Packard and Apple Com-
puters to terminate their operations in Burma. See id. (discussing impact of Massa-
chusetts Burma Law on highly visible companies' decisions to withdraw operations
from Burma). Additionally, the recent $1.25 billion settlement between the Swiss
Banks and Holocaust victims was believed to be partially in response to punitive
measures threatened by New York City. See id. As these examples illustrate, a
number of state and local actions are enjoying increasing success, as their reach
continues to expand. See Spiro, supra note 2, at 1249 (noting that "subfederal gov-
ernments now have clout").
162. See Malhotra, supra note 16, at 40 (noting that state and local actions are
not just token measures of condemnation). For a discussion of the possible impact
and far-reaching effects such laws may have on U.S. foreign relations, see supra
notes 158-61, & infra notes 163-70 and accompanying text.
163. See Malhotra, supra note 16, at 40. For a further discussion of the poten-
tial reach of such laws, see supra notes 155-58, & infra notes 161-67 and accompany-
ing text.
164. See Malhotra, supra note 16, at 40 (stating that some sub-national meas-
ures "are already enjoying success in altering the economic activities in foreign
nations or inducing foreign actors to actually change their policies"). In fact, Sec-
retary of State Madeleine Albright has even argued that states have a responsibility
to consider morality in developing their investment policies. See id. Nevertheless,
statements by any government representative regarding the precise issues
presented in this case should be taken with a grain of salt. See Dewey, supra note 5,
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the operation of United States foreign policy could prove disastrous if laws
akin to the Massachusetts Burma Law are allowed to develop around the
country. 165 With foreign governments already complaining of inconsis-
tencies in United States foreign policy, "the emergence of multiple, per-
haps contradictory, foreign policies" will likely "invite further international
indignation."1
66
Moreover, state and local involvement in matters best left to the fed-
eral government has the potential to dilute the effectiveness of federal
policies in the same or similar arenas. 167 The encroachment by states and
local actors into foreign affairs gives rise not only to international disap-
proval, but also threatens to compromise international trust and coopera-
tion.1 68 International consternation is driven not merely out of the fear
that state and local actions will steer contrary to federal policies, but also
by the "frustration and complications posed by the possibility of autono-
mous international actors within each state and city."1 6 9 Consequently,
the increase in sub-national actor participation in the foreign policy arena
at A19 (noting that Clinton administration has not taken stance on issue, "report-
edly because of a disagreement between the State Department and the National
Security Council ..."). To illustrate the executive discord in this area, consider
the statements of Undersecretary of State, Stuart Eizenstat, issued during congres-
sional testimony, in light of the above statement of Secretary Albright:
[A]d hoc and scattered actions at various levels of government, however
well-intentioned, can do more harm than good in achieving the desired
objective and impede the President's and the Secretary of State's conduct
of foreign policy.
Use and Effect of Unilateral Trade Sanctions: Hearing Before the Trade Subcomm. of the
House Ways and Means Comm., 105th Cong. 34 (1997) (statement of Undersecretary
of State Stuart Eizenstat).
165. See Malhotra, supra note 16, at 40 (noting that state and local laws have
potential to drive real change); see also Spiro, supra note 2, at 1258-59 (noting that
"state interests of any magnitude are unlikely to justify the potentially high na-
tional costs of a disrupted foreign policy"). For a further discussion of the conse-
quences to U.S. foreign policy that laws like the Massachusetts Burma Law create,
see supra notes 158-64, & infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
166. Malhotra, supra note 16, at 40 (discussing existing tense relationship with
foreign nations and likelihood that increased state and local participation in for-
eign affairs will lead to further international indignation over U.S, foreign policy).
167. See id. (stating that local activities have potential to create conflicting for-
eign policies and "ultimately to dilute the effectiveness of the policies themselves").
168. See id. at 41 (noting that absence of assurances that international agree-
ments will be enforced within states and municipalities has "potential to under-
mine international trust and cooperation").
169. Id. It is already difficult for foreign governments to deal effectively with
the sea of bureaucrats at the national level. See id. With increased sub-national
actor participation in foreign affairs comes yet another level of government; but
one that is devoid of a bureaucratic structure capable of sustaining international
negotiations. See id. Indeed, the level of accountability that is present at the na-
tional level is considerably lacking at the state and local level. See id. For example,
while international agreements can be "contested and compromised" at the na-
tional level, through vehicles such as ambassadors and embassies, state and local
governments lack such an "institutional framework" that is necessary for the effec-
tive resolution of policy disputes. Id.
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ultimately prevents the federal government from putting forth a united
front and hampers its ability to cooperate with its allies to foster positive
change in the international community.1 70
The First Circuit's decision to stem the tide of sub-national actor par-
ticipation in foreign affairs bodes well for the interests of the federal gov-
ernment, and the country at large. Nevertheless, the line between
permissible and impermissible state and local actor involvement in this
arena remains unclear. 171 Without a definitive pronouncement on the
acceptable level of sub-national actor participation in foreign affairs, state
and local governments could significantly interfere with matters best left
to the federal government. 172
Given the current composition of the Supreme Court and the empha-
sis the Court is placing on circumscribing the current debate over states'
rights, the resolution of this issue may prove quite interesting.17 3 None-
theless, even a Court as cognizant of states' rights as the current Court
should recognize the dangers 'that the Massachusetts Burma Law and simi-
larly situated laws pose to the nation's foreign policy.17.4 In this vein, the
Court should affirm the First Circuit's opinion in National Foreign Trade
Council v. Natsios and breathe new life into a doctrine that is both outdated
and overly ambiguous.
Brian T. Gorman
170. See id. (noting that expanding role of sub-national actors in foreign pol-
icy arena prevents central government "from sending a convincing and cohesive
message and hinders its ability to enlist the support of its allies").
171. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 51-52 (1st
Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (U.S. Nov. 29 1999) (stating that precise
boundaries of holding in Zschernig are unclear); see also Pascual, supra note 27, at
323 (noting that exact holding of Zschernig is ambiguous). As the preceding
sources intimate, cases and commentators alike have questioned the actual point
of demarcation between permissible and impermissible state and local actor partic-
ipation in foreign affairs. See Dewey, supra note 5, at A19 (stating that First Cir-
cuit's decision interprets train of ambiguous Supreme Court precedent).
172. See Dewey, supra note 5, at A19 (calling for definitive answer to whether
Massachusetts or any other state or municipality can have foreign policy).
173. See CNN Today (Cable News Network television broadcast, Oct. 4, 1999)
(noting that several states' rights cases are high on Court's agenda for October
term).
174. See Dewey, supra note 5, at A19 (noting that "[e]ven a Supreme Court as
respectful of states' rights as the current court is likely to recognize ... dangers [of
state involvement in foreign affairs] and conclude that ... Massachusetts should
step aside").
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